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WAYS TO THINK ABOUT THE UNITARY
EXECUTIVE: A COMMENT ON
APPROACHES TO GOVERNMENT
STRUCTURE
Michael Fitts*
Over the past few years public law debates have invariably focused on the relative significance of legal institutions as expressed in
formal legislative and administrative structures versus everyday politics in the resolution of policy questions. This emphasis has been particularly evident in the examination of the appropriate structure and
distribution of responsibility for administrative decision making, in
general, and presidential authority versus agency autonomy, in
particular.
In part, this increased focus on government structure has occurred as a response to new issues: the past few years have seen a
proliferation of new forms of agency structures and novel assertions of
executive power. 1 Just as scientific breakthroughs may result from
our confrontation with unexpected problems, so too the study of administrative institutions may be aided by the resolution of unique administrative dilemmas, which test the standard paradigms.
This focus has also been facilitated, no doubt, by the perception,
if not the reality, of increased identification of government and legal
institutions with particular ideologies. Because different political parties have dominated each branch of government for such a long period, the stakes for allocation of institutional power have been
unusually high. Strengthening a particular institution may not only
improve its effectiveness but also the relative influence of a particular
political party or ideology. 2 This effect can only have been enhanced,
moreover, by the increased ideological polarization of the debate be*

Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
See generally CASS SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION (1990); see also Cass
Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal: R econceiving the R egulawry State, 101 HARV.
L. REV. 421 (1987).
2 For the most part, stronger executive powers meant stronger Republican influence; enhanced legislative influence meant greater D emocratic control. See Michael Fitts, Can Ign orance Be Bliss? Imperfect Information as a Positive Influence in Political Institutions, 88 MICH.
L. REv. 917 ( 1990). Judicial responsibility fell in between, perhaps depending on whether one
was speaking about the Supreme Court or the lower courts. See Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Som e Implication s of the Supreme Court's Limited Resources for
Judicial R eview of Agency Action , 87 CoLUM. L. REv. 1093 (1987).
1
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tween the parties during the Reagan period and the strength of the
assertions of executive powers during this era. 3
Of course, the recent return to one party domination of both
branches might lead one to expect a diminution in the temperature of
this debate. However, one activist President, Ronald Reagan, appears
ultimately to have been succeeded by another activist President, Bill
Clinton. Strong presidents by their force of personality and visibility
may test the limits of institutional powers. 4 Moreover, the change in
institutional control brings the meaning and significance of institutional design into even sharper focus . Many conservatives and liberals may be forced to revisit their prior statements about executive,
judicial, and legislative powers. 5
In this politicized environment, how do or should we attempt to
resolve questions of institutional responsibility and power? How can
we achieve a system of structural design which receives broad support
and legitimacy? The purpose of this Comment is to explore how each
of the papers in this group reflects on these questions, namely, how
they approach structural issues. This leads me away somewhat from
their substantive topic-the interpretative powers of the presidency
and agencies-and focuses instead on the general institutional principles at stake in the debate. My underlying point is that, while the
papers reach similar conclusions on the interpretative role of the President, they are quite different in their underlying approach. In this
sense, they reveal something about the different literatures that seek
to explain and justify different institutional designs. My comments
seek to elucidate the techniques we use to justify institutional design
and the underlying goals and tradeoffs at issue.
What are these generic approaches? As lawyers, the first place to
which we look in resolving such questions is ordinarily the decisions
of the past, as captured in the text of the Constitution and constitutional history, however broadly defined. Unfortunately, this obvious
first stop invariably becomes complicated by the ambiguity inherent
3 A ny discussion of institutional powers in an academic setti ng, let alone a political setting, has been vastly complicated and sharpened by the substantive ends to which these powers
would be applied.
4 Just as a Ronald R eagan may wish to assert authority over agencies previously viewed as
independent or poli tically neutral, so a Bill Clinton may wi sh to rewo rk much of th e mil itary
or the healthca re system through executive control.
5 One recent example is the statement of Senator George Mitchell , historically a firm
believer in strong legislative powers, th at a legislative limitati on on homosex uals an d lesbians
in the military would be unconstitutional as an intrusion on presidential power over the
military.
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in historical interpretation whenever hard questions are raised. 6 Our
roots are frequently understood only in light of current perceptions,
interests, and theories.
For some academics, one important theory for evaluating administrative design has been the new economics of institutions, which
shows how legislative and administrative structures can serve through
their formal and informal design to minimize transaction costs.
Paralleling the economic analysis of private corporate design, 7 socalled public choice theory offers an economic model of political and
administrative institutions. Of particular interest of late has been the
attempt to understand and explain the design of administrative agencies as a means for facilitating ongoing legislative control and oversight. 8 For the most part, this so-called "congressional dominance
literature" is positively oriented, seeking to explain how administrative structures can be understood instrumentally as an outgrowth of
the political forces in Congress, which originally secured passage of
the legislation and sought to extend its influence into the future. At
the same time, it has been used by legal academics to better understand the problems of democratic accountability and inefficiency in
agency performance. 9 It thus can begin to offer affirmative prescriptions for reforming the political economy of government performance.
From a quite different perspective, the design of political institutions has been evaluated according to the extent to which they further
distinct normative goals. Those who believe in a particular moral philosophy might be thought to focus less on questions of administrative
procedure. Yet, normative approaches that emphasize dialogue--especially civic republicanism-are more easily focused on the question
of procedural design. Thus, civic republican scholars have offered a
moral defense for a variety of administrative procedures that might be
thought to further deliberation and reflection within the executive
branch. If the congressional dominance view seeks to understand leg6 For a good summary, see Cass Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State,
103 HARV. L. REV. 405 (1989).
7 See OLIVER WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1985).
8 See Matthew D . McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 243 (1987); Matthew D . McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Structure and Process, Politics and Policy:
Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431 (1989);
Morris Fiorina, Legislator Uncertainty, Legislative Control, and the Delegation of Legislative
Power, 2 J.L. ECON. & 0RG. 33 (1986).
9 See, e.g. , Michael Levine & Jennifer L. Florence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest,
and the Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 167 (1990); Michael Fitts &
Robert Inman, Positive Political Theory and Public Law II: Controlling Congress: Presidential
Influence in Domestic Fiscal Policy, 80 GEO. L.J. 1737 (1992).

326

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15:323

islative delegation as a response to democratic or interest group control, civic republicanism views it as a means of furthering normative
accountability. 10
From a more traditional perspective, legal structures can also
further a variety of normative ends simply by establishing a precommitment to certain goals and procedures at a time when the application to individuals or groups on the future is unclear. To varying
degrees such precommitments can be reflected in constitutions, substantive legislation, administrative structure, regulations, or simply
judicial common law. In addition to norms of consistency and openness, this is ordinarily what we mean by rule of law.
While the substantive focus of the papers contained in this group
varies, they each reflect distinct approaches to these structural questions. Of course, two of the papers (those of Professors Herz and
Devins) are primarily case studies that describe how conflicts over
unitary control have resolved themselves in particular cases; the other
two (Miller and Lessig) are more comprehensive, seeking to develop a
general theory of executive power derived from the Constitution. But
in the end, their conclusions tend to be similar: presidents should be
strong in a specific range of cases, except where there is an administrative argument for agency autonomy. 11 Even Geoffrey Miller, who
probably falls more on the unitary executive side, concludes that "in
practice, of course, neither the unitary nor the splintered version of
the executive prevails." 12
In light of this, what I find most interesting about the papers is
the different ways they approach these issues. 13 Each of the articles
can be seen as relying on different legal institutions and conventions in
the resolution of policy and institutional allocation questions. To
what extent do formal administrative and legislative structures matter, and toward what ends should they be directed-minimization of
10 Of course, administrative law is vitally concerned with the pursuit of the rule of law
within administrative agencies. Rule making (establishing broad principles that are later applied in individual cases) and adherence to norms of administrative consistency have been two
of the traditional means for furthering these goals. Civic republicanism has sought to rely on
administrative structures that further debate and discussion-presuming the existence of an
underlying moral community-as a principle goal of administrative agencies. See Mark
Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, !05 HARV. L. REV.
1512 (1991); Cass Sunstein, Factions, Self-Interest and the APA: Four Lessons Since 1946, 72
VA. L. REV. 271 (1986).
11 Neal Devins's paper, which is primarily factual, is the exception.
1 2 Geoffrey P. Miller, The Unitary Executive in a Unified Theory of Constitutional Law:
The Problem of Interpretation, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 201, 206 (1993).
13 On this level, each of them directly contributes to this more general question of how we
should understand the operation of administrative institutions and how we should attempt to
improve them.
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transaction costs, promotion of civic dialogue, and/or furtherance of
a rule of law? And how can we reach an agreement on such goalsthrough comprehensive precommitment strategies (as found, ordinarily, in a constitution or metaconstitution), by structural legislation,
or by more ad hoc political bargaining? 14 These issues are similar to
the substantive constitutional debate over abstract versus clause based
textual analysis in constitutional law, except here the discussion focuses on alternative institutional mechanisms for resolving conflict. It
is such issues, more than the articles' specific conclusions about the
appropriate strength of the presidency-about which a great deal has
already been said in this symposium-on which I will focus. By examining the mode of argument of each paper, I hope to situate them
within this general discussion about how administrative structures
should be created and evaluated.
Let me begin with the two pieces that seem to call for a more
comprehensive and formal resolution of these questions. Lawrence
Lessig's paper sets forth to determine what the Framers actually intended with respect to presidential powers and allocation of responsibility. From a purely legal point of view, it is a quite interesting-and
important-thesis. Proponents of a unitary executive have often
tended to be adherents of constitutional originalismY Lessig argues
that these are largely incompatible positions. After raising questions
about the meaning of the Take Care Clause 16 and its history, Lessig
shows persuasively that the practice both before and after the framing
of the Constitution was quite varied and complicated, and thus cannot
be held to sustain a unitary position. 17 Instead, Lessig relies on the
general distinction made between the executive and administrative
functions, which he argues should be applied today-presumably by
Congress-under the general banner of what is a "proper" allocation
of power. 18
As we all know, and as Lessig recognizes, legal scholars have
hotly debated the significance of language and history to the resolution of such questions. 19 This is not the place to summarize, let alone
14 At stake is wh en and why dec isio ns should be reso lved through formal instituti ons, as
opposed to more info rmal methods.
15 S ee Steven G . Calebresi & K evin H . Rhodes, Th e Structural Con stitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary , 105 HARV. L. R Ev. 1155 ( 1992).
16 U.S. CONST. art. II , § 3.
17 Lawrence Lessig, R ea dings by Our Un itary Executi ve, 15 CARDOZO L. RE v . 175 (1 993).
18 In other wo rds, since the practice was suffici ently varied so as to pres ume some vagu e
distinction, only future common law application, presum a bly by Congress, ca n hope to capture
the complex ity of thi s m eaning.
19 Lessig does a good job of reassessing this question in light of th e new learnin g. My
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enter, this extended debate. 20 Wherever one comes out in this discussion, it is clear that language and history have inherent ambiguities
based on conceptual assumptions regarding group and multi-institutional intent. The passage of time further complicates the analysis, as
the application of understandings reached in what was clearly a different society becomes increasingly confusing. Subsequent constitutional amendments-and "constitutional moments"-may further
complicate that reasoning. 21
In light of these issues, it is worth noting that Lessig's particular
approach-looking in detail at the varied practice across government
at the moment of the framing-may tend to limit his ability to generalize concerning any conclusions he may draw. Lessig is clearly correct that the Framers were not of one mind about the proper
organizational structure for the different departments. 22 In light of
this varied practice, he shows that an originalist cannot believe in a
clear unitary view of constitutional powers; only an application of a
general principle of "propriety" will work.
While this is certainly a reasonable conclusion, it is not unexpected given his approach. Once the complexity of the real world is
confronted, it is frequently more difficult to generate clear general
principles. In this sense, the more rigorous an originalist one becomes, and the better one understands the rich complexity of the
world in which the Framers existed, the less one may be able to say
about general but comprehensive principles. It is thus not surprising
that his approach would lead to the application of a somewhat vague
principle-''propriety"-by future congresses. Ultimately, Lessig
seems to believe that only an incremental nonrule bound system can
capture this complexity.
This is certainly not to suggest Lessig is "wrong," but only that a
different type of interpretative approach could come out differently.
Lessig offers evidence that there was a distinction drawn between execution and administration in the constitutional history body and in
later legislative practice. But, as with all historical claims, he makes
implicit assumptions about who were the Framers and what counts in
determining intent. While Lessig does make important arguments
against some types of originalists, he surely has not ended the depassing over the contribution he makes is intended merely to suggest his focus is somewhat
outside the purview of the current analysis.
20 See. e.g., WILLIAM EsKRIDGE & DANIEL FARBER, LEGISLATION (1988).
21 See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE (1991).
22 Lessig, supra note 17, at 186.
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bate--as I am sure he would recognize--for those who would balance
arguments about original intent with other structural approaches.
That is one of the differences between Lessig's paper and that of
Geoffrey Miller, who also seeks to interpret the President's constitutional authority, but ultimately argues for a comprehensive commitment to substantive institutional principles. In comparison to Lessig,
Miller's article more directly confronts the question of what level of
generality should we evaluate the Constitution on and its historical
meaning-namely, what metaprinciple should be used to resolve the
inherent ambiguities in structural design? Though he gives a classical
lawyer's response--look to the whole of the Constitution-he uses a
far broader brush than Lessig by looking both at provisions on individual liberties and the underlying purpose of the Constitution. 23 In
his view, "a unified theory should seek to identify concepts that organize both structures within a single model. " 24 In particular, he
claims that the structural and individual rights sections of the Constitution should be reconciled into a more general principle of government which seeks to protect individual liberties from intrusion by
other individuals as well as the government. 25 From this perspective
"[t]he fundamental problem of government design, according to the
authors of the Federalist Papers, is to minimize the sum of two costs:
(1) the costs of private expropriation and violence on the one hand,
and (2) the costs of governmental expropriation and violence on the
other.'' 26
This approach is distinctive in two respects. First, Miller expressly attempts to answer broad questions of structural design in
terms of basic substantive normative principles. Rather than viewing
structure as a means for generating evolving principles over time, he
starts with a broad normative principle against which the structure of
government, and its evolving policy decisions, must be weighed.
While this places supreme importance on the general acceptance and
inclusiveness of the normative principle, it also asks an important but
often ignored question: toward what ultimate ends should the structure of government be directed. To the extent procedure is an instrumental means to a substantive end, there is a place for resolving the
appropriate ends of structural design first and moving then to ques23 See, e.g., CHARLES L. BLACK JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw (1969); Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425
(1987); Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1513

(1991).
Miller, supra note 12, at 209.
25 Economists would probably view the latter as rent-seeking.
26 Miller, supra note 12, at 210.
24
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tions of specific design of the Constitution, and the resolution of its
necessarily ambiguous clauses. 27 This clearly is a "top down"
nonanalogical approach to interpretation of structural design. 28
While Lessig might argue that this "picture" holds Miller "captive," 29
Miller presumably believes this stands as a better resolution of the full
body of the Constitution and articulation of its underlying moral
tradeoffs.
The resort to general principles may also serve to foster a degree
of abstraction and generality among decision-makers which can be
useful in illuminating debates about institutional structure. Of course,
the focus on the structure and procedures of agencies-as opposed to
substantive outcomes-can itself abstract away from the particular interests of individuals at a particular moment in time. Yet placing that
structural debate in terms of abstract principles can go one step further. 30 You can't generalize much more than by conceiving the role
of government as a balancing of two interests.
Yet, there is a downside to this approach, as there is with any
comprehensive analysis, the problem of underinclusion and evolution.
For example, for many, the role of government would seem to be
broader than the protection of private property interests. Even from a
traditional law and economics perspective, government intervention is
ordinarily justified on the grounds of market externalities and high
transaction costs, which can be subsumed under the broad goal of
"promoting the general welfare." Indeed, several of the specific functions of government agencies discussed by Miller, such as the Federal
Reserve Board and the Environmental Protection Agency, seem to be
justifiable on these grounds, but probably not as easily under a protection of private property and liberty theory alone.
A limitation on redistribution raises similar questions of underinclusion. One goal of government may simply be to redistribute re27 While Miller certainly does not go as far as to require a resolution of fir st principles, his
style and mode of argument certainly seeks to abstract to general principles of government
more than any of the other papers.
28 See Cass Sunstein, Commentary: On Analogical R easoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741
(I 993); Richard Posner, Lega l Reasoning From the Top Down and From the Bottom Up: Th e
Question of Unenumerated Constitutional Rights, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 433 (1992).
2 9 Lessig, supra note 17, at 176.
30 At first blush this may seem odd. Reference to substantive principles often exacerbates
conflict as participants-be they academics or real world political participants--come to understand and focus on the implications of allocations of institutional authority in terms of the
particular substantive interests and goals that immediately matter. The veil of ignorance is
pierced, as it were. Yet Miller's description of substantive goa ls is itself of such a high level of
generality that it seems in most respects to avo id this problem. It serves as a metaconstitutional principle. A host of different groups from both the traditional "Right" and "Left" can
be seen as having their interests protected by such broad principles.

1993] WAYS TO THINK ABOUT UNITARY EXECUTIVE

331

sources from one group to another. While the Framers may have
wanted to make certain types of redistribution more institutionally
difficult, to what extent should they be held to make redistribution
institutionally impossible? If not, one probably needs a theory about
when permissible redistribution ends and rent-seeking beginsY
Finally, a reliance on comprehensive first principles also tends
not to incorporate a civic republican role for government. To the extent that one views the structure of government as seeking to establish
a process by which values will evolve over time, a flight to substantive
principle could be viewed as cutting off debate and dialogue. Needless
to say, a top down approach is different from a "bottom up," evolutionary approach in this regard. 32 Whatever one's ultimate position, a
variety of administrative law principles seem to have been justified on
such grounds. 33
All of these issues arise in a variety of different contexts. For
example, Miller draws a distinction between the avoidance of "faction," which is presumably bad, and protection of an agency's "specialized mandate," which is presumably good. Also, he would restrict
presidential powers in the case of the money supply due to concerns
of "manipulation" or "short term political gain." 34 Such distinctions
seem better understood on motivational or civic republican grounds.
Similarly, redistributional choice probably cannot be avoided once we
begin to confront intergenerational or temporal conflict, where government decisions having long term impact implicate the relative interests of future versus current generations. This problem is raised by
many of the most recent structural changes intended to reduce the
deficit, such as Gramm Rudman or balanced budget amendments, or
by environmental laws. As a logical matter, it is difficult to say which
group or generation-the present or the future-should have the distributional property right.
All of these considerations complicate one's ability to resolve certain institutional allocation questions using a comprehensive approach. Once a question of institutional power is understood to
implicate distributional as well as dialogic goals, it becomes more dif3t See Einer R. Elhauge, Does Int erest Group Theory Justlfy More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 YAL E L.J. 31 (1991), for an argument that such a position is untenable.
32 See supra note 27.
33 Indeed, a great deal of administrative law can probably be understood, if not explained,
on such civic republican grounds. The obvious examples are rule making and open government laws. The allocation of institutional responsibility can also be understood on such terms.
In many cases, defenses of agen cy autonomy, especially by neo-Weberians, rely on such
grounds.
34 Miller, supra note 12, at 216.
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ficult to give directed answers. It might be possible, making certain
strong assumptions, to apply Miller's decision rule for minimizing the
intrusion on individual property interests and get reasonably determinate answers; it seems more difficult to add to such calculations certain distributional and dialogic goals and converge on specific
conclusions. This is not to detract from the power of Miller's insight,
which is intended only to clarify ambiguities in the Constitution. Yet
as he recognizes, and as Lessig argues, generality clarifies some issues
and obscures others.
If Miller seeks to pursue a constitutional resolution of such issues
through comprehensive rationality, Neal Devins focuses on the opposite approach-incremental decision making. He wishes to understand how political actors, faced with the broad institutional
constraints of the Constitution and legislative structural design, resolve questions of authority in particular controversies. His conclusion: structure matters less than we think.
Of course, Devins's paper is largely positive, not normative.
Devins believes that administrative law scholars place too much
causal significance on the formal structure of administrative agencies
in explaining their decisions. Under the standard textbook paradigm,
independent agencies are viewed as independent of presidential will
and control, while nonindependent agencies are firmly under central
governmental direction. Devins suggests otherwise, arguing for "the
centrality of politics." 35 Based on an illuminating review of three disputes over the control of both independent and nonindependent agencies, he argues that the influence of the President turns less on the
formal independence of the agency and more on the political configuration of forces in Congress, the White House, and the agency. While
others have de-emphasized the significance of the formal distinction
between independent and nonindependent agencies, 36 Devins does a
good job of showing how independent agencies can be brought under
presidential will, as well as how nonindependent agencies can resist
that pressure. 37
This rich history raises obvious questions about any highly predictive theory of institutional design, whether based on public choice
or rule of law principles. Adherents of the congressional dominance
view, for example, presume that there is a great deal of importance
35 See Neal Devins, Political Will and the Unitary Executive: What Makes an Independent
Agency Independent?, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 273, 275 (1993).
36 See Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the
Fourth Branch , 84 CoLUM. L. REV. 573 (1984).
3 7 Devins, supra note 35, at 311. Needless to say, I have a great deal of sympathy with this
view .
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and predictability to agency structure. Congressional coalitions are
able not only to predict their future interests over time but to write in
institutional allocation devices which will effectively further their future will. The history Devins relates raises questions about this. As
Devins shows, congressional framers often seem not to have thought
about institutional questions, to have guessed wrong, or to have positively decided to ignore the issue. Indeed, the highly quixotic allocation of litigation authority across the federal government described by
Devins underscores this point. 38
Along similar lines, Devins reminds us that presidents may be
ambivalent about the need for coherent strong presidential leadership.
In his account of the Bush, Nixon, and Clinton presidencies, Devins
reminds us that the administrations were and are quite amenable to
appointment of different people with inconsistent views to different
agencies, principally as a means of avoiding the conflict inherent in
making comprehensive decisions. Strong presidential powers and institutions do not necessarily lead to clear centralized leadership without a political incentive structure that offers benefits to such actions.
In this sense what may look like a centralized comprehensive legal
structure can produce incremental diverse results if the political incentives strongly run in that direction.
At the same time, one should be wary about reading too much
into these case studies. Devins's thesis-that politics counts-is
clearly unassailable, as political scientists have been telling us lawyers
for years. Indeed, in my own work, I have sought to model and test
formally the relative significance of political resources in strengthening the presidency vis-a-vis divided and centralized congresses. 39 The
political preferences of the actors in the White House, Congress, and
the agency clearly effect the outcomes of decisions. But legal scholars
of institutional design as well as adherents of congressional dominance, really only suggest that structure can stimulate and organize
political coalitions and debate, not determine outcomes. 40 Even if one
thinks that the structure of an agency is important, the goals of those
within that structure count. How much they count is the relevant
issue, and it is not clear that the case studies resolve that question.
For example, while the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
38 Devins, supra note 35. See also Neal Devins, Unitariness and Independence in Solicitor
General Control of Independent Agencies (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
39 See Fitts & Inman, supra note 9, at 1737; Robert Inman & Michael Fitts, Political Institutions and Fiscal Policy: Evidence from the US. Historical Record, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 79
(1990).
40 Put another way, the Coase theorem can be used to analyze the structure of agencies as
well as other legal allocations of property rights.
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("EEOC") did capitulate in the Williams case, it is unclear how much
Chairperson Thomas really cared about the issue, especially in light of
the political resources of a popular President and an Office of Legal
Council ("OLC") opinion that may have served as an independent
structural constraint. Only if one were able to measure preferences of
all the different parties could one say anything definitive about how
important structure is. Power is the ability to impose one's will on
others; one needs a prior specification of will of all the parties to measure power.
Indeed, as Devins recognizes, there is some evidence in the case
studies that structure does count. For example, Devins's review of
the legislative history of the EEOC also reveals that legislative framers intended to put the agency into a no-man's land, under some but
not complete presidential control. This decision was made, according
to Devins, precisely because the Framers were trading off questions of
enforcement and congressional control. "Congress's inability or unwillingness to create a truly executive or independent EEOC," he observes, "set the stage for the Williams controversy. " 41 Such cross
pressures ultimately led the EEOC to change positions. In this sense,
the legislative creators of the agency may have intended to produce
precisely the compromise that resulted. If true, the absence of political support in Congress at the time of the Williams controversy was
to be expected in light of Congress's earlier views about the agency
and what its place should be. Structure counted, though indirectly,
through its effect on fashioning current "political will. "
From the opposite perspective, the case of the postal service
could be interpreted as demonstrating structure was important in allowing the commissioners to resist pressures.42 Despite a furious assault by the Bush administration, albeit at a time when its lame-duck
status minimized its political resources, the commissioners appointed
by the Reagan and Bush administrations did not capitulate.
There is another limitation on the " political will" explanation
which is suggested by both the Devins and the H erz case studies. In
several cases Devins refers to the understanding of Congress that the
EEOC was one of " its" agencies. 43 This understandi ng was not a result of formal institutional design, but rather of informal understandings and expectations. This appears to be evidence of a common law
of institutional powers-a type of rule of law that practitioners of institutional combat recognize but which is not written into legislation
41

42
43

Devins, supra note 35, at 292.
See id. at 29 8.
See id. at 293.
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or the Constitution. In effect it shows how prior decisions and agency
or congressional interactions can serve informally to bind future political behavior, even though they are not formalized into positive law.
Certainly those of us who have practiced this type of law are familiar
with the phenomenon. 44 To put it in Devins's terms, it is a common
law type limitation on current political wil1. 45
Of course, in the end, Devins does not express an opinion on the
appropriate design of administrative institutions. Yet the distinction
he draws between politics and law is fundamentally a distinction between comprehensive analysis and incrementalism. Agency structures are a consequence of longer term political arrangements under
each of the models described above. Politics, as Devins describes it, is
much more the application of political will in the particular context.
By arguing for the importance of the latter, Devins reminds us that
structure is not determinative, and that incrementalism is both an important, and sometimes a valuable means of resolving disputes.
Michael Herz's paper offers another case study of institutional
combat between the President and agencies, which in some ways is
quite similar to Devins's view. Politics mattered here as well. Like
Devins, Herz shows that the formal dependence of agency-in this
case the Environmental Protection Agency ("EP A")-did not stop it
from challenging centralized leadership. While ultimately the White
House did impose its will, a nonindependent agency like the EPA was
quite willing and able to defy White House views for an extended
period. By bringing in supportive oversight committees and the public, the agency was able to make the White House pay a high price for
the imposition of its will. The formalistic distinction between independent and nonindependent agencies was obviously important, but
the agency enjoyed some leeway.
At the same time, the independence of the agency may itself have
been the result of political structure, though of a different kind.
Agencies are often closely aligned with supportive oversight committees, which help protect them against presidential directives. As the
legislative dominance literature has shown formally, this relationship
may be an intended consequence of legislative organization and
agency administrative structure. The importance of structure thus
needs to be analyzed horizontally, as well as vertically.
Indeed, as Herz shows quite well, the intersection between law
See Strauss, supra note 36, at 592.
On one level one could simply define this as politics and its impact another sign of the
significance of poli tics on the outcomes. I am suggesting, however, that it represent something
a little bit different-a common law type constraint on agency behavior.
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